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Strong credit growth since the mid-1990s has resulted in a near doubling
of Ireland’s private-sector credit (PSC) to Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
ratio. Household credit as a proportion of personal disposable income has
risen even more rapidly; from 43 per cent in 1993 to 95 per cent in 2003.
Since the start of EMU, PSC in Ireland has grown at annual rates roughly
three times those of the euro area. These developments have led to
concerns that Ireland may be becoming one of the most indebted countries
in the euro area. In this article, consistent measures of PSC for all euro-area
countries are used to provide a benchmark for the Irish position. A range
of comparisons are employed. First, countries are ranked according to their
PSC/GDP ratios. Second, the relative importance of lending to the
household sector is examined, with particular emphasis on housing finance.
Third, the cost of various categories of household credit in Ireland is
compared with the euro-area average and with some other euro-area
countries. The results are, on balance, reassuring. Ireland is not an outlier;
on most rankings it is about midway in the euro area. While Ireland enjoys
one of the lowest costs for housing finance at present, the high proportion
of variable rate mortgages here leaves Irish borrowers more exposed to an
increase in interest rates.
1. Introduction
The rapid growth in Irish private-sector credit (PSC) in recent
years has given rise to some concerns that its level may now be
excessive. If this is true, both banks and their customers may be
incurring a degree of risk which could have negative implications
for the stability of the Irish financial system and for the rate of
economic growth in the future.
There are a number of alternative approaches to measuring
whether the private sector is over-indebted. One approach, used
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), is to examine
indicators of the private sector’s ability to repay. A second
method, used in a recent publication by Kearns (2004), is to
develop a measure of ‘debt at risk’ for the household and
corporate sector. A third approach, which is employed in this
article, is to benchmark the level and structure of debt against
other countries at a similar stage of development.
*The author is Deputy Head of Statistics. The views expressed in this article are not necessarily
those held by the CBFSAI and are the personal responsibility of the author. He would like to
thank Peter Charleton and Sharon Donnery for helpful comments, and colleagues in the
Statistics Department for their invaluable assistance.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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The other countries in the euro area are an obvious set with
which to compare Ireland. One of the main problems with inter-
country comparisons of credit is that aggregate measures and
definitions may not be consistent across all countries in the
sample. This is overcome in the euro-area context by the fact
that all Eurosystem countries compile credit data in accordance
with common guidelines established by the European Central
Bank.
1
The article begins with a brief review of developments in PSC —
that is both corporate and household credit — over the past
decade, a period in which the ratio of PSC to GDP almost
doubled. This provides the context for the next section, which
contains the central comparison of the level of credit in Ireland
at end-2003 with that in other euro-area countries. Two measures
of credit are used for Ireland; headline PSC and PSC less lending
to non-bank IFSC companies. Since much of the comment on
credit levels is addressed to the personal (or household) sector,
the article looks particularly at the importance of lending to
households — both over time in Ireland and relative to other
euro-area countries. In addition to its level, the cost of credit to
the household sector is important in determining individuals’
debt service burden. Recently published data on retail interest
rates and household lending volumes make it possible to divide
lending to households into housing and non-housing credit and
to compare the cost of credit to these sub-sectors across the
euro area.
2 Finally, some conclusions are drawn from the
statistical analysis, and their implications for the Irish economy
are discussed.
2. Trends in Irish Private-Sector Credit
The very rapid rise in PSC since the mid-1990s means that the
Irish private sector is now highly indebted by historical standards.
Concerns have been expressed that this may make Irish
economic growth more susceptible to adverse shocks, and that
credit institutions may be more vulnerable to sharp increases in
unemployment and/or interest rates and to possible decreases in
house prices (IMF, 2003). But a little over a decade ago, it was
the weakness of credit growth, rather than its strength, which
gave rise to concern about its impact on future economic
growth. This was particularly so in the years leading up to and
following the 1992-93 currency crisis. In these years, Irish interest
rates were both high and volatile and worries about the future of
the EMS Exchange-Rate Mechanism (ERM) created an uncertain
financial environment. This and concerns about future borrowing
1 Individual country measures of PSC, published by national central banks, may differ slightly;
for instance, in Ireland’s case accrued interest is included in the national measure but is
excluded from the ECB measure.
2 New monthly retail interest rate statistics for the euro area and most individual countries
were published for the first time on 10 December 2003. These statistics are based on a
common methodology and, in contrast to the previous retail interest rates published by the
ECB, are comparable across the euro area. For further details see McNeill (2003).Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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costs provided a less-than-ideal backdrop for additional personal
or corporate borrowing.
In 1991, the slowdown in economic activity was accompanied
by a decline of about 1 per cent in PSC. While some once-off
factors contributed to this
3, there was speculation that a ‘credit
squeeze’, with banks either unwilling or unable to lend, might be
hampering growth. The Central Bank, however, found that there
was no evidence to support this view. Banks were not generally
constrained by capital requirements or liquidity conditions. The
fall-off in credit appeared ‘‘to have been largely demand driven,
with the financially sounder economic agents moving to reduce
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Chart 1: Private-Sector Credit/GDP Ratios for Ireland
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In the event, interest rates in Ireland declined quite quickly
following the realignment of the Irish pound on 30 January 1993,
while the strains within the ERM reduced significantly following
the widening of margins of fluctuation from ±2.25 per cent to
±15 per cent in August 1993. Growth in credit, however,
remained modest until the mid-1990s, especially when lending
to non-bank International Financial Services Centre (IFSC)
companies is excluded.
4 The rationale for excluding such lending
3 PSC in 1991 was reduced as a result of the unwinding of £415 million in foreign-currency
Section 84 lending to Shannon-Area companies, which had to expire by end-December
under the 1989 Finance Act. Without this, PSC would have grown by about 2 per cent.
4 The decision to promote an international financial services centre in Dublin was taken in
1987 and was encouraged by the provision of fiscal incentives, including a 10 per cent rate
of corporation tax. Lending to IFSC companies became important in the early 1990s and
was identified separately in credit statistics. An adjusted growth rate for PSC, which
excluded lending to non-bank (or non-Monetary Financial Institution) IFSC companies, was
introduced in 1992 (see Box 1).Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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is that it largely reflects transactions between international banks
and non-banks located in the IFSC and has little impact on the
domestic economy.
Developments in the ratio of PSC to GDP from 1990 to 2003
are shown in Chart 1. In the early years of the 1990s the ratio
was steady at around 65 per cent for total PSC but fell to close
to 60 per cent in 1993 to 1995 when IFSC lending is excluded.
From 1996 onwards, however, both measures accelerated, even
though nominal GDP itself expanded at unprecedented rates
during most of this period. This increase in the ratio was
attributable to the fact that annual growth rates in PSC reached
very high levels — as shown in Chart 2.
At first, the acceleration in credit growth was seen as a welcome
catch-up from the slow growth experienced in the early 1990s.
Then, as the decade progressed, expectations that Ireland would
be amongst the first group of countries in Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) strengthened. This led to a belief that
Irish interest rates would fall sharply and remain permanently
lower than they otherwise would have been. In such a situation
it became optimal for Irish households and firms to consume and
invest more and to take on substantially more debt (see Nickell,
2003). Against a background of strong real growth, rising
disposable income and expanding investment opportunities,
annual growth rates in excess of 25 per cent were not unusual.
Box 1: The Adjusted Rate of PSC Growth
Financial analysts and economists are interested in both stock and flow
measures of private-sector credit. The key stock measure is the aggregate
level of credit on credit institutions’ balance sheets, reported to the CBFSAI
at the end of each month. This aggregate is published in Table A2 of the
Monthly Statistics and the Statistical Appendix to the Quarterly Bulletin,
together with two measures of year-to-year change. The unadjusted rate
measures the actual change in the stock of credit. The adjusted rate seeks
to present a truer picture of the flow of new credit to the domestic
economy. Two adjustments are made to the original series to achieve this.
First, changes in the outstanding stock of credit arising purely from the
effect of exchange-rate changes in converting non-euro credit (mostly US
dollar and sterling) to euro are calculated and added to/subtracted from
the annual change in the balance sheet data. Prior to the introduction of
the euro, this valuation effect involved a much wider range of currencies.
Since foreign currency credit in DM, French francs, etc. became euro credit
in January 1999, it is not possible to calculate an adjusted rate for 1999.
The year-to-year adjusted growth rate to January 2000 is used as a proxy
in Table 1. Second, lending to non-bank companies in the IFSC is excluded.
This adjustment was introduced in December 1992, as lending to IFSC
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Chart 2: Private-Sector Credit Growth in Ireland
(y/y%) 1993-2003
Note: break in adjusted rate in 1999, due to changeover to the euro
Trends in unadjusted and adjusted credit growth over the period
1993 to 2003 are shown in Chart 2, where it can be seen that
they follow broadly similar paths for most of the period, with the
latter recording somewhat lower rates. Since 2002, however,
there has been a marked divergence between the series, with
the adjusted measure growing at a faster rate. The reasons for
this stem from the two elements of the adjustment (see Box 1).
First, since mid-2001, the euro has appreciated strongly,
particularly against the US dollar but also against sterling.
5 This
has caused the euro value of credit denominated in these
currencies to fall. Since the adjusted series excludes changes due
to valuation effects, it therefore increased at a faster rate. Second,
the gap between the two series is accentuated by the fact that
credit to IFSC companies has been falling for most of this period.
In the year to end-December 2003, total lending by credit
institutions to IFSC companies contracted by almost \2.6 billion
to \19.3 billion (Table A2, Statistical Appendix).
As well as resulting from high real growth rates from the mid-
1990s onwards, it is likely that rapid credit growth itself may have
been a factor contributing to the ‘Celtic Tiger’ experience. Earlier
work on business cycle indicators showed a strong link between
PSC and economic activity, with real PSC having one of the
largest weights in a ‘Composite Coincident Indicator’ for Ireland
(Fagan and Fell, 1992). A recently published NBER Working
Paper (Ranciere et al., 2003) lends weight to this view. This study,
5 Between October 2000, when it reached its lowest level against the US dollar, and end-
December 2003, the euro appreciated by 52.2 per cent against the dollar and by 22.1 per
cent against sterling.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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which examined the experiences of 52 countries, concluded that
there is a trade-off between steady growth in bank lending and
economic growth over time. Many of the fastest growing
countries experienced lending booms; countries in which credit
growth was smooth, by contrast, exhibited the lowest real growth
rates. Overall the analysis suggests that countries where credit
expanded rapidly grew by two percentage points a year more,
on average, than those where credit growth was stable, with
banks’ lending growth accounting for about one percentage
point of this. The downside, of course, is that rapid credit growth
can also contribute to financial fragility and many countries
which have experienced lending booms have also experienced
occasional crises. So far, Ireland has only experienced the
beneficial growth effects. But if, in the process, we have become
one of the most highly-indebted countries in the euro area,
perhaps the risks to the stability of the financial system may also
have increased.
3. Private-Sector Credit in Ireland and the Euro
Area
Since the start of EMU in 1999, PSC in Ireland has grown at
annual rates roughly three times those of the euro area as a
whole (see Table 1). But given that borrowing levels here were
relatively low by EU standards in the mid-1990s, the main
question now is, has the rapid growth in recent years led to
Ireland becoming an outlier within the euro area?
Table 1: Private-Sector Credit Growth Rates — Ireland and the
Euro Area
End Dec 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Ireland: Unadjusted annual % change 33.5 20.6 16.5 10.1 12.4
Adjusted annual % change 28.8a 21.3 15.1 15.0 17.9
Euro Area: Annual % change 10.5 10.3 6.7 4.7 5.7
a Year to end-January 2000.
Source: CBFSAI and ECB.
In order to address this question, it is necessary to obtain a
measure of PSC to domestic residents for all euro-area countries
constructed in a consistent manner. Data from the ECB and the
IMF International Financial Statistics were used for this purpose.
The standardised measure of PSC used here is the sum of private
sector loans, securities and shares (see Box 2) at end-2003. The
ratio of PSC to GDP is used as the basis for comparing credit
levels between countries.
6 In benchmarking Ireland’s position,
two measures of Irish PSC are employed in Table 2; the
standardised measure and this measure less IFSC lending. This
second measure is further adjusted by adding to it outstanding
6 GDP is the preferred measure of economic activity as it is almost universally used in EU
comparisons. Use of GNP would result in a somewhat higher ratio for Ireland but the
general picture would be unchanged.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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securitisations of residential mortgages (see Box 3 in Section 4)
in order to provide an upper bound measure of PSC to the
domestic economy.
Box 2: Measuring Credit
One of the problems inherent in comparing credit across countries is that
confusion can often arise between different measures of credit and the
items included in each. The three main credit aggregates are domestic
credit, private-sector credit and personal (or household) credit. Total
domestic credit (DC) encompasses all credit advanced by Irish credit
institutions to Irish resident entities, both the general government (GG) and
the private sector (PSC). PSC, in turn, is simply all lending by credit
institutions to the non-bank public, excluding Government. It includes
personal credit (PC), credit to non-financial corporations (NFC) and credit
to other financial intermediaries (OFI). Put schematically:
1. DC = GG + PSC
2. PSC = PC + NFC + OFI
Another source of confusion is that credit is sometimes equated with loans.
While loans are the largest component of PSC, it also includes credit
institutions’ holdings of securities and shares and other equity issued by
private-sector Irish residents. Since the personal sector does not issue
securities or equity, personal credit will invariably be comprised of loans.
A common difference between countries in the measurement of PSC is
whether accrued interest is included or not. In Ireland’s case accrued
interest forms part of PSC (Table A2: Statistical Appendix) but in the ECB’s
measure of euro-area PSC it is excluded. The standardised measure of PSC
for euro-area countries used in this article excludes accrued interest.
Table 2: PSC/GDP Ranking for the Euro Areaa
2.1: Ireland, PSC 2.2: Ireland, PSC-IFSC
Country PSC/GDP (%) Rank Country PSC/GDP (%) Rank
Netherlands 154.8 1 Netherlands 154.8 1
Portugal 146.2 2 Portugal 146.2 2
Ireland 120.1 3 Spain 119.2 3
Spain 119.2 4 Germany 117.3 4
Germany 117.3 5 Luxembourg 114.8 5
Luxembourg 114.8 6 Ireland-IFSC 105.7 6
Austria 104.7 7 Austria 104.7 7
France 90.8 8 France 90.8 8
Italy 85.3 9 Italy 85.3 9
Belgium 76.7 10 Belgium 76.7 10
Greece 71.9 11 Greece 71.9 11
Finland 63.9 12 Finland 63.9 12
a On the basis of December 2003 PSC and 2003 GDP estimates from Eurostat.
Source: CBFSAI, ECB, IFS and Eurostat.
The rankings in Table 2 clearly confirm that Ireland is not an
outlier. In terms of an unadjusted standardised measure of PSC,
Ireland is placed third, well below the Netherlands and Portugal
and with a ratio only slightly higher than that of Spain, Germany
and Luxembourg. When IFSC credit is excluded, Ireland drops to
sixth position, with a ratio just fractionally above Austria’s.
Adding securitisations of residential mortgages increases
Ireland’s ratio to 109.1, but its rank in Table 2.2 is unchanged.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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In general, a correlation exists across countries between levels of
income and credit/GDP ratios. Those with higher levels of
income can afford to service higher levels of debt and also tend
to have higher levels of wealth. From the mid-1990s onwards, as
Ireland’s PSC/GDP ratio increased substantially (see Chart 1),
real GDP growth here outstripped that in most other euro-area
countries by a significant margin. As a result of this, Ireland
climbed steadily up the European ladder in terms of GDP per
capita. The outcome, as shown in Table 3, is that we rose from
ninth position in 1993 to second place in 2002. In becoming one
of the highest income countries in the euro area, it would have
been surprising if our PSC/GDP ratio had not risen.
Table 3: Euro Area GDP per Capita 1993 and 2002 (\000s)
1993 2002
Country GDP/Capita Rank Country GDP/Capita Rank
Luxembourg 29.9 1 Luxembourg 50.2 1
Germany 20.6 2 Ireland 33.1 2
Austria 20.1 3 Netherlands 27.5 3
France 19.0 4 Austria 27.1 4
Belgium 18.3 5 Finland 26.9 5
Netherlands 18.2 6 Germany 25.6 6
Italy 14.9 7 Belgium 25.2 7
Finland 14.6 8 France 24.8 8
Ireland 11.9 9 Italy 21.7 9
Spain 10.9 10 Spain 17.2 10
Greece 7.7 11 Greece 12.9 11
Portugal 7.4 12 Portugal 12.5 12
Source: Eurostat and ECB Monthly Bulletin.
4. The Importance of Lending to Households
If the PSC/GDP ratio in Ireland is not out of line with that in
other euro-area countries, perhaps it is the proportion of personal
(or household) credit in this aggregate which is giving rise to
concern. Residential mortgage lending has been expanding
much faster than PSC in recent years and worries are expressed
from time to time that individuals may be taking on unsustainable
levels of debt. If this were true, then households might be forced
to cut back on consumption in the event of a significant increase
in interest rates or an extended slowdown in economic growth,
thus exacerbating that slowdown.
Rapid growth in household debt has been relatively common in
most developed countries over the past two decades, with most
of the increase coming from borrowing for housing. While the
timing and extent of the increase varied considerably across
countries, two common causal factors have been identified:
lower interest rates, both real and nominal; and an easing of
liquidity constraints, arising from financial deregulation. Lower
real interest rates reduce the real cost of borrowing and
encourage households to take on more debt. Lower nominal
rates, in addition, reduce debt servicing costs and may increaseQuarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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the maximum amount which a credit institution will lend at a
given income level (Wadhwani, 2002). The easing of liquidity
constraints, which accompanied the financial deregulation of the
past two decades, has enabled households to improve the
structure of their consumption spending over the life cycle by
taking on more debt at an earlier stage (Debelle, 2004).
Both of the above influences have been at work in Ireland during
the 1980s and 1990s. Credit ‘guidelines’ and restrictions on
interest rates had forced banks to impose credit rationing in the
past. These constraints began to be relaxed in the mid-1980s,
when the Central Bank discontinued its formal guidelines for
bank lending. Additional resources were released to fund higher
lending when reserve ratios were reduced in the early 1990s.
The banks’ primary liquidity ratio was progressively cut from 10
per cent in 1991 to 3 per cent in 1994, while the requirement
to hold Government stocks — the secondary ratio — was
abolished (Kelly, 1994). The ‘interest-rate cartel’ gave way to a
more flexible system of maximum interest rates for given
categories of loans which in turn was abolished in the run up to
EMU membership, in a much more competitive environment.
Competition was at its most intense in the residential mortgage
market, where deregulation facilitated new entrants which both
increased the availability of housing finance and reduced its cost.
In addition, as already mentioned, EMU membership itself
heralded a move to permanently lower interest rates.
Annual growth in household credit began to accelerate from the
mid-1990s onwards, although initially at a somewhat slower pace
than PSC. This is, in part, a reflection of the very rapid increase
in lending for ‘Financial Intermediation’ (including non-bank IFSC
companies) during this period, which powered the growth in
headline PSC. In order to take account of this, a range of
measures of household credit and housing finance are examined
in Table 4, which is based on data from the sectoral distribution
of advances (Table C8: Statistical Appendix).
A number of points emerge from Table 4. Looking at personal
credit first in Table 4.1, it is clear that the share of PSC going to
the personal sector has risen significantly in recent years — from
about 35 per cent in 2000 to almost 43 per cent last year. A
longer view, however, presents a different picture and over the
past decade there has been a small decline, with the personal
share falling by one percentage point, from 43.7 per cent in 1993
to 42.7 per cent in 2003. A somewhat different picture emerges
when lending to financial intermediation is deducted from PSC.
The share of personal credit in the remainder was steady from
1993 to 2001 but showed significant gains in 2002 and 2003.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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Table 4: Personal (Household) Credit as a Percentage of PSCa
and Disposable Income
4.1 Personal Credit % of PSC % of PSC- % of Personal
(\ million) Fin. Int. Disp. Income
1993 12,504 43.7 51.8 43.3
1994 13,812 43.7 52.5 46.5
1995 15,624 43.1 52.6 48.1
1996 18,115 42.5 52.6 51.8
1997 21,911 40.3 52.6 56.9
1998 26,129 38.9 51.5 60.3
1999 32,935 35.7 53.3 67.3
2000 39,231 35.3 51.7 71.3
2001 45,594 35.2 51.9 74.1
2002 56,403 39.5 55.0 82.9c
2003 68,539 42.7 55.4 95.3c
4.2 Housing Financeb % of PSC % of PSC-Fin. % of Personal
(\ million) Int. Disp. Income
1993 9,475 33.1 39.3 32.8
1994 10,606 33.6 40.3 35.7
1995 12,030 33.2 40.5 37.1
1996 14,038 32.9 40.7 40.2
1997 16,787 30.9 40.3 43.6
1998 20,151 30.0 39.7 46.5
1999 24,936 27.0 40.3 50.9
2000 30,048 27.0 39.6 54.6
2001 34,705 26.8 39.5 56.4
2002 44,120 30.9 43.0 64.8c
2003 55,189 34.4 44.6 76.7c
a The credit data refer to end-November from 1993 to 1998 and to end-December from 1999
onwards.
b Items 15.1 and 15.2 from Table C8: Statistical Appendix.
c Personal disposable income data for 2002 and 2003 are internal CBFSAI estimates.
Source: CBFSAI and CSO.
Housing finance is examined separately in Table 4.2 and here a
somewhat similar trend is evident. The proportion of housing
finance in total PSC falls progressively from 1994 to a low point
in 2001, before rebounding sharply to over a percentage point
above its 1993 share in 2003. Housing finance also accounts for
a steady proportion of PSC less financial intermediation until
2001 and then rises sharply. Implicit in these figures is the fact
that housing now accounts for a somewhat higher proportion of
personal credit than it did a decade ago; it has, in fact, increased
its share by five percentage points, from 76 per cent in 1993 to
81 per cent in 2003. This suggests that for many households,
their mortgage may be their only or dominant debt. It is also
reassuring in that it confirms that widespread borrowing for
consumption was not a factor behind the expansion in credit in
recent years.
The final columns in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show personal credit and
housing finance as a percentage of personal disposable income.
Here a striking change has occurred over the period. Personal
sector credit has more than doubled relative to personal
disposable income, rising from about 43 per cent in 1993 to over
95 per cent in 2003.
7 The increase in the stock of housing
7 The IMF in its 2003 Article IV Report noted that the average household debt to income
ratio in Ireland, while rising rapidly, was not high by international comparison (IMF, 2003).
This was on the basis of 2001 data, however, when Ireland’s ratio was 74 per cent; by end-
2003, that ratio had risen to over 95 per cent.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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finance is even more marked; from 33 per cent of disposable
income in 1993 to 77 per cent in 2003. While lower interest
rates mean that the burden of debt service has not increased as
much, the larger stock of personal debt has important
macroeconomic implications. In particular, it increases the
sensitivity of household expenditure to fluctuations in income,
especially arising from unemployment, interest rates and house
prices.
Although there has been no trend increase in the share of
personal sector credit in total Irish PSC over the past decade, it
now accounts for a larger proportion of the remainder of credit,
i.e. PSC less financial intermediation. This increase has been
driven by strong growth in housing finance, a development
common to some other EU countries. In view of this, it is useful
to compare the Irish position at end-2003 with other euro-area
countries, in order to benchmark the present situation.
This cross-country comparison is provided in Table 5. The ECB
definition of PSC is used for Ireland — i.e. accrued interest is
omitted — and no adjustment is made for lending to financial
intermediation, as it would be impossible to identify this sector
consistently across all countries. Once more, Ireland is placed
towards the middle of the rankings, this time in seventh position
in the euro area.
Table 5: Lending to Households as a Percentage of PSC — Euro
Areaa













a In the data used in this table, households are defined in accordance with ESA 95. This definition
is broader than the CBFSAI personal category and includes loans to self-employed and
partnerships and to non-profit institutions serving households. As a result, Ireland’s household
share in PSC is a little larger than in Table 4.
Source: Internal CBFSAI data for December 2003.
Given the predominance of housing finance in personal credit
and the fact that residential mortgage lending is adjusted for
securitisations to reflect the full indebtedness of individuals for
house purchase (see Box 3), it is also interesting to look at
Ireland’s position with securitisations added in. This increases
Ireland’s ratio to 44.9 per cent, which would move it up two
places to fifth position in Table 5, just ahead of Belgium.
8
8 Residential mortgage securitisations, which amounted to \4.63 billion at end-December
2003, are included in both lending to households and PSC in this calculation.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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Box 3: Residential Mortgage Securitisations
Securitisation is defined as a ‘‘process whereby finance can be raised from
external investors by enabling them to invest in parcels of specific financial
assets. It involves credit institutions selling loans to third parties, which use
these loans to back the issue of securities’’ (ECB/2003/2). A mortgage
securitisation refers to a block of residential mortgages that are sold to
investors. The third party involved in this transaction is known as a Special
Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or a Financial Vehicle Corporation (FVC). While
SPVs are usually set up by credit institutions, they are classified as other
financial intermediaries (OFIs), which are part of the private sector, rather
than Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs).
Typically, a mortgage securitisation takes place as a ‘triangular’ operation,
with the aim of the credit institution being to release resources by selling
loans to the SPV. The SPV finances the purchase via the issue of securities
backed by the loans. The transactions are reflected in the respective
balance sheets as follows:
A Cred. Inst. L A SPV L
−100 Loans +100 Loans +100 Debt securities
issued
+100 Cash
When a securitisation occurs, the mortgages are removed from a credit
institution’s balance sheet. This reduces the level of residential mortgage
lending shown in the monthly credit aggregates. But nothing has changed
for borrowers. To take this into account, the outstanding stock of
securitised mortgages is added to the balance-sheet level of residential
mortgages to give an adjusted series. This series is seen as a more
meaningful economic indicator as it gives a more accurate measure of
personal sector indebtedness for housing.
If adding securitisations to residential mortgage lending improves the
information content of that series, it might be argued that they should also
be included in the adjusted measure of PSC. A problem, however, arises
in that this could lead to double counting. Since residential mortgage
securities are issued by SPVs, which are OFIs, their purchase by any MFI
reporting to the CBFSAI would be included in PSC. Given the diversity
of the population of Irish MFIs, secondary market purchases of mortgage
securities cannot be ruled out. Hence, adding the full stock of
securitisations to PSC could artificially inflate this figure.
5. The Cost of Household Credit
The above comparison with other euro-area countries shows that
Ireland is not untypical in terms of either its PSC/GDP ratio or
the proportion of credit going to the household sector. A further
aspect concerns the cost of household credit. If interest rates
in Ireland were higher than elsewhere, it could mean that debt-
servicing costs for Irish households would be above the euro-
area norm even if credit levels were not.
Since January 2003, the national central banks (NCBs) of the
euro area have collected data for new harmonised interest-rate
statistics.
9 These statistics show the average retail interest rates
9 The data are collected under Regulation ECB/2001/18, which was adopted by the ECB in
December 2001.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
141
applied by banks to a range of deposit and loan instruments.
10
Lending to households is identified separately from lending to
non-financial corporations and, within the household category,
average interest rates on three maturity categories of loans for
house purchase and consumer/other credit are calculated. These
data were published by the ECB and a number of NCBs for the
first time in December 2003. Their availability makes it possible
to compare interest rates across euro-area countries on a
consistent basis. This is done in Table 6, which shows the average
interest rates on the two sub-categories of lending to households,
namely, house purchase and consumer credit and other loans,
broken down by the term of the loan. Overdraft rates for
households are also included. Since the data are not published
in the same level of detail by all NCBs, euro-area average rates
are shown together with those in a number of other, mainly
smaller, countries. The percentage of household lending
accounted for by each loan category is also shown for Ireland
and the euro area as a whole. Rates and volumes are for
outstanding amounts; these rates are less volatile from month to
month than rates on new business.
Table 6: Average Interest Rates on Loans to Households —
December 2003a
For House Purchase Consumer/Other Credit
Country Bank Up to 1-5 Over Up to 1-5 Over
Overdraft 1 year years 5 years 1 year years 5 years
Austria 7.75 5.08 4.33 4.81 7.60 5.77 5.16
Belgium 10.63 4.47 4.84 5.37 8.20 7.24 5.99
Finland 6.48 3.35 3.54 3.55 7.79 4.81 4.09
Germany 10.48 5.55 5.01 5.79 8.89 6.35 6.28
Greece 14.08 5.75 6.20 5.16 13.07 11.18 8.43
Ireland 12.93 3.90 3.98 3.65 9.97 6.93 4.67
Luxembourg — — — 3.64 3.50 5.31 —
Netherlands 6.69 4.01 4.84 5.29 6.62 8.14 5.59
Portugal 9.80 — — 3.82 8.89 7.84 6.73
Euro Area 9.70 4.96 4.88 5.14 8.04 7.05 6.00
Percentage of Total Household Lendingb
Ireland — 1.4 3.5 72.7 5.6 7.6 9.2
Euro Area — 0.5 1.9 64.6 7.3 7.9 17.8
a Rates refer to outstanding amounts for house purchase and for consumer credit and other
loans.
b Overdraft volumes are included in consumer credit up to one year. Use of ESA 95 definitions
in this table, as in Table 5, explains the difference in the percentage share of housing in
household credit from that implicit from Table 4.
Source: ECB and Eurosystem NCBs.
Ireland emerges in a particularly favourable light from the
comparison of interest rates charged for house purchase in
Table 6. Across all terms of loan, Ireland is one of the cheapest
countries in which to borrow. In the key ‘‘over five years’’
10 In calculating averages, interest rates are weighted according to volume, at the level of
reporting agents, the NCBs and the ECB. For an illustration of the process see Klein et. al
(2003), page 115.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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category, which accounts for 73 per cent of all household
lending here, average interest rates are 1.5 percentage points
below the euro-area average and are just ten basis points above
Finland’s, which are the lowest. The position regarding consumer
and other credit is not so clear cut; Ireland is the second most
expensive country in the table for short-term credit (up to one
year) but the second cheapest for long-term credit of over five
years. Rates on bank overdrafts are also amongst the highest
here and at end-December 2003 were over three percentage
points above the euro-area average. The categories where Irish
interest rates are among the highest, however, account for a
relatively small proportion of household lending. Consumer/
other credit up to one year, which includes overdrafts, is only
5.6 per cent of the total.
The favourable picture which emerges with regard to the relative
cost of credit for house purchase in Ireland must be qualified by
one important caveat; a high proportion of this credit is at
variable interest rates. CBFSAI data show that about 80 per cent
of residential mortgages are at variable rates (Table C13;
Statistical Appendix)
11, while an analysis of lending for housing
during 2003 yields similar results; some 78 per cent of new
business was at variable rates. Moreover, two-thirds of fixed-rate
mortgages are fixed for a relatively short duration of one to three
years. This means that a high proportion of mortgages are
exposed to the risk of interest rate increases if and when the ECB
tightens monetary policy.
Table 7: Percentage of Mortgages At Fixed or Variable Interest
Rates
Country Interest rate arrangementsa Usual length of contracts
Austria n.a. n.a.
Belgium F (75%), M (19%), V (6%) 20 years
France F/M (86%), V (14%) Over 5 years
Finland F (2%), V (97%) 15-20 years
Germany Mainly M and F Up to 30 years
Greece F (5%), M (15%), V (80%) 15-20 years
Ireland V (70%), M (30%) n.a.
Italy F (28%) 10 to 25 years
Luxembourg V (90%) 20 to 25 years
Netherlands F (74%), M (19%), V (7%) 10 years
Portugal Mainly V 25-30 years
Spain V (more than 75%) 15-25 years
a Per cent of all new mortgage loans.
Note: F=Interest rate fixed for more than five years; M=Interest rate fixed for more than one year
and up to five years; V=after one year, interest rate is negotiable or tied to market rates.
Data refer to 2001.
Source: ECB, Structural Factors in the EU Housing Markets, March 2003.
ECB data also confirm that Irish borrowers are more exposed to
changes in short-term interest rates than those in the rest of the
11 Variable-rate mortgages include mortgages with rates fixed for up to and including one
year, as these give only limited protection from interest-rate changes. Some studies,
however, may include one-year fixed-rate mortgages in the ‘fixed’ category.Quarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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euro area. Despite some integration in banking markets since
the start of EMU, a study of the housing market shows that the
proportion of mortgages contracted at variable interest rates still
differs significantly across euro-area countries (ECB, 2003). Data
from this study are reproduced in Table 7, where it is clear that
fixed-rate contracts dominate in most of the larger countries. As
might be expected, those countries currently enjoying the lowest
rates, such as Finland, Luxembourg, Ireland and Portugal, are also
the countries with a high proportion of variable-rate mortgages.
6. Conclusions
In the years immediately before and after EMU membership,
Ireland experienced very high rates of growth in PSC. This was a
logical outcome in a situation of strong growth in real GDP and a
move to a regime which was seen as bringing about a permanent
reduction in real interest rates. While very rapid credit growth
naturally raises concerns about the stability of the financial
system, it may also have had beneficial effects in terms of real
economic growth. The challenge is in keeping the balance right.
The results from the benchmarking of Irish PSC against other
euro-area countries are, on balance, reassuring; Ireland is not an
outlier. The central comparison with the rest of the euro area, in
terms of the ratio of PSC to GDP, found that we are part of a
mid-ranking group of countries which includes Austria, Germany,
Luxembourg and Spain. Nor is the proportion of credit going to
households excessive. On the euro-area benchmark, Ireland still
ranks seventh in terms of the share of PSC accounted for by
households. This suggests that at the overall level risks in Ireland
are no greater than elsewhere. Some individual borrowers, and
perhaps lenders, may be behaving imprudently and
developments must be monitored, so as risks in these areas can
be identified.
A favourable position emerges in terms of the present cost of
credit to the household sector. Two factors influence this: first, in
Ireland a high proportion of personal credit is secured on
residential property; and, second, a large portion of lending for
housing is at variable interest rates at a time when short-term
interest rates are at historically low levels. This latter point
contains the ‘sting in the tail’. It means that the exposure to
interest-rate changes is greater here. If and when short-term
interest rates rise, the cost of household borrowing in Ireland
would be expected to increase more quickly than that in many
other euro-area countries.
The vulnerability of Irish households to higher interest rates is
amplified by the marked rise in the ratio of household credit to
personal disposable income in recent years. Aggregate personal
indebtedness is now approaching 100 per cent of disposableQuarterly Bulletin Spring 2004
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income and rising fast. The larger stock of personal debt means
that consumer expenditure will be more sensitive to fluctuations
in income, especially arising from unemployment and interest
rates. While the greater vulnerability of the Irish economy to
increases in short-term interest rates is not of immediate concern,
as debt levels increase in absolute terms so do the risks to growth
from either a tightening in monetary policy or a slowdown in
economic activity. Certain areas of the housing market have
been identified by the IMF as being particularly exposed to such
developments (IMF, 2003). This underlines the need for vigilence
and prudent lending practices if the beneficial effects of past
credit growth are to be retained.
The acceleration in the growth of PSC in recent months is also
of concern. Following modest growth in 2002, the annual
adjusted rate of PSC growth strengthened last year and reached
19.3 per cent in February 2004, over three times the euro-area
rate of 5.8 per cent. While our end-2003 position within the euro
area was comfortable, there is a limit to the extent that Ireland
can sustain rates of credit growth which are a multiple of the
euro-area average. If such differences were to persist, Ireland
could become an outlier within a few years.
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